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Abstract  
The African ancient civilizations played influential roles in global 
trade and power relations; in recent histories and contemporary times, 
persistent failures of dependent economies and political leaderships 
underdeveloped the continent by oppression and manipulative investments. 
Focusing on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, our paper 
applied a Pan-Africanist framework to assess the impact of Gulf States’ 
investments on the African setting. The paper stressed the predetermined 
cycle of investments that exchanged massive flows of the collected and/or 
accumulated surpluses into the Gulf, Chinese, and other foreign investors, 
whereas the poorest African most targeted recipients were the least 
benefitted. Despite the ambiguity and scarcity of accessible information on 
the Gulf/African businesses, we have heavily drawn available facts from 
United Nations and international sources, as well as critical views by Pan-
African scholars, human rights’ activists, and political opponents. To ensure 
sustainable development free of exploitation and abuse of authority for the 
African peoples, foreign investors should avoid the past colonial and/or neo-
colonial ventures that dispossessed the land and manpower of the Continent, 
reinstated wealth-and-power thirst rulers in authoritative systems of rule, and 
impoverished indigenous farmers and the low-income workers and 
professionals with lasting poverty. 
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Introduction 
Africa was a haven of ancient prosperity and human flourishment. In 
the fourteenth century, the African thinker ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Khaldun 
(1332) theorized in his Muqadimah [introduction] the impact of different 
climates and natural environments on people’s attitudes and social 
interactions (Baali, 1988; Ibn Khaldun, 1997). In the twentieth century, the 
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African scholar Cheikh Anta Diop (1923-1986) developed an African-
centered theory with weighty reliance on European writings on Africa and 
Europe. The Civilization’s Two Cradle Theory (1963) was well-celebrated in 
the studies of cultural anthropology, history, and sociology on the origins of 
human thought, societal behavior, and domains of the individual and social 
life. Diop believed the human geography climate, resources, and other 
factors shaped the social life’s attitudes of the two continents in a very 
different way: the European North Cradle of civilization resembled a life of 
hard struggles to ensure survival in the face of a hostile nature, thus bringing 
about an array of social structures and attitudes favorable to the prevailing 
conditions and hardships of life. Contrariwise, the African South Cradle of 
Civilization flourished as a nature-loving society with abundant resources, 
optimistic perspectives, and collective forms of thought (Diop, 1986:47-
102).  
The Bedouin cultures of the Arab Peninsula exhibited same 
characteristics of the Southern Cradle’s extended families and Saharan 
solidarity. But the small emirates of the Peninsula were not comparable to 
the colossal civilizations of Africa. The Peninsula, however, was the 
promised land of Islam’s universal civilization which embraced great space 
of the world. Since old ages, Arabia exercised active exchanges of migration 
and trade in neighborly relations with Africa. In the Year of the Elephant 
(570 CE) though, Ethiopia led an abortive expedition to conquer Mecca. But 
in 614 A.D., the Ethiopian “King Armah (Negash) granted refuge to the 
family of the Prophet Mohammad [pbuh] that arrived at Aksum while fleeing 
from their pagan persecutors” (Tadias Staff: 2008).  In 638 CE, a Muslim 
caliphate governed Egypt as the Monophysite Christians “saw the Arabs as 
liberators. So too did Egypt's peasants, who had felt oppressed by tyrannical, 
mostly Greek, landlords” (Macro History, 2007). Besides the experiences of 
ruling elites and foreign domination in the old ages, and the trade and 
cultural linkages with the Islamic Mali, Songhai, Fulani, and Funj empires 
and the kingdoms of Morocco, Chad, and Darfur, the modern histories of the 
Gulf and Oman Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the Republic of 
Yemen shared large populations of the African manpower of which millions 
of Muslims exercised pilgrimage to the Holy City of Mecca.  
The Mother Continent was well-known for the deep spirituality of her 
peoples who maintained many indigenous belief systems, in addition to the 
majority Africans who believed in Christianity and Islam monotheistic 
religions. Unlike their Muslim neighbors whose understanding of religion 
emphasized the Shari’a legal rulings, the African Muslims adopted largely 
the Sufi Islam that recognized their love of Nature as corresponding to the 
fitra normality, the essence of Shari’a realization of personal freedoms and 
the values of equity, justice, and human solidarity. These same values 
European Scientific Journal May 2017 edition Vol.13, No.13 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
3 
influenced the trade and commercial transactions of the African domestic 
markets which continued to rely heavily on the verbal words of spiritual trust 
based on the family and community collaterals and ethno-religious junctions. 
Needless to say, these indigenous values were simply ignored by the Arab 
and Chinese businesses that signed bilateral contracts with government 
agencies in recent times to construct hydroelectric dams among lucrative 
ventures misappropriating vast agricultural lands and displacing 
pharmaceutical production. 
This particular pattern of underdevelopment seemed to be rooted in 
the political heritage of the Gulf. Documenting a long history of conflicts 
between the ruling Sheikhs and contending merchants under British 
administration, Oil and politics in the Gulf Rulers and merchants in Kuwait 
and Qatar concluded, “Oil brought new forces which restructure political 
life. Within a few years of the postwar resumption of operations, oil revenues 
dominated both economies… Most critically for politics, these revenues, 
rents, are paid directly to the state or, in the Gulf, the rulers. One 
consequence of these revenues is to affect the independent power of social 
groups and to weaken the links between state and society. A second is to 
increase the power of the state” (Jill Crystal, 1990:6). Regardless of the 
absence of formal information on the multi-million deals of Qatar with the 
ruling regime in Sudan, for example, it wasn’t difficult to assume that the 
Qatari investments in Africa applied similar strategies to “pay directly to 
rulers” and the rest. These and other related issues would be analyzed in the 
section on the Gulf Investments in Africa.  
All in all, the negative attitudes of foreign investors perpetuated non-
democratic rule and dehumanized society: “The most serious threat to 
democracy, civil society, and reform remains, in the impoverished 
economies of African states. Democracy will not take root in Africa if the 
majority of its population continues to live in abject poverty. Africans 
support democracy because they expect it to reverse decades of corruption, 
mismanagement, and economic hardship. Only innovative domestic 
economic policies coupled with a reform of the international economic 
arrangements to take into account the difficult conditions of African states 
can create the conditions necessary for human development” (Mutua, 
2000:38).  
For hundreds of years, the African peoples who used to maintain 
good neighborly links with European and Arab counterparts became a 
subject of slave trade up to the nineteenth century when the shameless 
activity was finally outlawed by international law. Postcolonial Transitions 
in Europe, Contexts, Practices and Politics indicated: “demographic 
colonialism… In the various Eurafrican partnerships that have been 
promoted since the 1920s, power and agency have always been on the 
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European side, while Africa has figured as a safety valve ensuring Europe’s 
bio-political stability. Each time demography has governed European 
migration policy vis-à-vis Africa, what has first been introduced as a mutual 
interest, or as a “partnership of equals,” has quickly been transformed into a 
geopolitical relationship, where one partner has sought to manage migration 
to its own benefit” (Ponzanesi & Colpani, 2016:61-2). The African suicidal 
trips to Europe by ill-equipped boats across the Mediterranean flagged a 
most dehumanizing context of this demography.   
“The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights recognizes the right to work ‘which includes the right of everyone to 
the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or 
accepts’ (art. 6(1)). In articles 5, 7, and 8 the Covenant further sets certain 
conditions and rights that must be upheld and protected by the States parties 
such as fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value and the 
right to form and join trade unions” (David Weissbrodt and Anti-Slavery 
International; OHCHR, 2002:7-8). Unfortunately, the international 
protection of wage labor was reportedly violated in Middle-East markets 
versus Asian and African labor, albeit reservedly resounded in the Gulf 
media (Al Jazira, 2016). In Kuwait, “Labor ministers from Gulf and Asian 
countries should improve labor law protection, reform abusive immigration 
policies, and increase dialogue with trade unions and nongovernmental 
groups, 90 human rights organizations and unions said. Millions of contract 
workers from Asia and Africa, including an estimated 2.4 million domestic 
workers in the Gulf, are subject to a wide range of abuses, unpaid wages, 
confiscation of passports, physical abuse, and forced labor” (Human Rights 
Watch, 2014). 
“Qatar Gulf State with its infamous kafala system can be a living hell 
for migrant laborers, excluded from labor law and under a forced labor 
system akin to a modern slavery. The situation in Saudi Arabia is similar for 
in Saudi Arabia, which employs a staggering 8.3 million migrant’s make up 
90 to 95 per cent of the private sector workforce but are excluded from labor 
law and endure forced labor akin to slavery. The slow legal system means 
many are stranded without work but without the ability to go home. In the 
United Arab Emirates, non-national workers make up more than 88 per cent 
of the population. Migrants are excluded from labor law and endure forced 
labor, with excessively long hours, seized passports and changed contracts a 
part of working life. Migrant workers in UAE also don’t have the right to 
join a union or go on strike, so those that speak up risk prison and 
deportation” (The World Post, 2017). 
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The Pan-African Movement 
The African thought has been remarkably geared and engineered to 
address reality with a view to help enforce an optimum change Maulana 
Karenga eloquently conceptualized as “the activist-intellectual tradition... 
This tradition extends back to ancient Egypt with its model of the socially 
conscious and activist intellectual, the sesh, who understood themselves in 
both moral and social terms and constantly expressed a commitment to using 
their knowledge and skills in the service of the people… improving the 
human condition and enhancing the human prospect” (Karenga, 1993:7-8). 
Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. DuBois, and Frederick Douglass emphasized the 
need to strengthen the oneness of Africans by all possible economic, 
ideological, and political ties. “The whole history of the progress of human 
liberty shows that all concessions yet made to her august claims, have been 
born of earnest struggle. If there is no struggle there is no progress. Those 
who profess to favor freedom and yet depreciate agitation, are men who want 
crops without plowing up the ground, they want rain without thunder and 
lightning. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters” 
(Douglass, 1857; cited in BlackPast, 2007).  
Since contemporary conditions of the African peoples in Diaspora 
and the Continent continued to face enduring hitches of the passing 
centuries, it was appropriate to rethink this situation in light of the Pan-
Africanist thought. Throughout the twentieth century, W. E. B. Du Bois and 
Pan-African leaders provided intriguing intellectual and practical 
possibilities to develop a successful international movement that would 
necessarily build-up progressive bondages between African-descent 
populations all over the world. By the mid-sixties, Kwame Nkrumah led with 
William Du Bois the Pan-African Movement triumphantly to motivate the 
African heads of state to create the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 
Addis Ababa, 1963. Along with the 1960s’ momentum of independence and 
liberation movement, the following years saw the African Charter for Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (1981) which adopted a clear Africanist orientation.  
The Pan-Africanist leaders were gravely concerned for the sabotage 
of African history in the Diaspora. In 1935, Du Bois addressed the issue 
movingly in Black Reconstruction in America. The success of Black 
Americans in constitutional governance right after the Reconstruction [1865–
77, the period of readjustment following the American Civil War] granted 
them the right to vote. “We may recognize three things which negro rule 
gave to the South: 1. Democratic government. 2. Free public schools. 3. New 
social legislation” (Du Bois, 1935:795-6). Two decades later, Cheikh Anta 
Diop “found it more judicious to make the necessary effort to rediscover the 
general history of the Black world and that of the African world in particular. 
From such knowledge of our past, it will be possible to establish the African 
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contribution to world progress by a simple comparative method, beginning 
with the fundamental traits of African culture and taking into account 
chronology… the notion of culture is tied to the emergence of a 
multinational state embracing almost the entire continent” (Diop, 1996:114).  
The Post-Colonial Africa: The African [Banjul] Charter’s Preamble 
stipulated that "freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives 
for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples "
(ACHPR, 2017). The Charter aimed “to eradicate all forms of colonialism 
from Africa; coordinate and intensify cooperation and efforts to achieve a 
better life for the peoples of Africa; to pay a particular attention to the right 
to development and to the fact that civil and political rights cannot be 
dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights; and achieve the total 
liberation of Africa, the peoples of which are still struggling for their dignity 
and genuine independence” (ACHPR, 2017). These tenable provisions by the 
continent’s post-independence forefathers of whose anti-colonialist struggles 
the Charter was radically wrought, were not consistently implemented by 
many succeeding leaders, rulers, or governments.  
Article 17-2 of the Charter emphasized the significance of traditions 
in Africa: “Every individual may freely, take part in the cultural life of his 
community. 3. The promotion and protection of morals and traditional values 
recognized by the community shall be the duty of the State.” Article 18-1 
“The family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be 
protected by the State which shall take care of its physical health and moral. 
2. The State shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian or 
morals and traditional values recognized by the community. 3. The State 
shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also 
ensure the protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in 
international declarations and conventions. 4. The aged and the disabled shall 
also have the right to special measures of protection in keeping with their 
physical or moral needs.” 
Article 21-1 “All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and 
natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the 
people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it. 2 In case of spoliation the 
dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its property 
as well as to an adequate compensation. 3. The free disposal of wealth and 
natural resources shall be exercised without prejudice to the obligation of 
promoting international economic cooperation based on mutual respect, 
equitable exchange and the principles of international law. 4. States parties to 
the present Charter shall individually and collectively exercise the right to 
free disposal of their wealth and natural resources with a view to 
strengthening African unity and solidarity.”  
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The founding fathers of the Charter were crystal clear about the 
negativities of foreign investments, especially if they failed to cater equally 
for the needs and claims of native Africa. Article 20-3 of the Charter 
dictated, “All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the States 
parties to the present Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign 
domination, be it political, economic or cultural.” Nonetheless, “all forms of 
colonialism” were not yet eradicated; the virtues of African cooperative and 
collective cultures were seriously interrupted by the expansion of foreign 
investments that spared no vantage of profit-making from within the virgin 
lands and laden resources of the continent, with scant or no concern for the 
direct results of these transformations in the life of the majority indigenous 
farmers, poor workers and state employees.  
This paper did not discuss in detail the extent to which African 
peoples took advantage of foreign investments in the last twenty years or so. 
Persistent high infant mortality rates (IMR), low levels of literacy, 
outstanding service debt, and high ranks of uncontrolled state corruption 
testified to the failures of overwhelming foreign investments to benefit the 
majority of Africans, as well as default of the ruling leaderships to show 
deserved allegiance to the people they undeservedly ruled. The repressive 
relationships of African governments with African people constituted 
egregious violation of the African Charter’s emphasis on public freedoms 
and human rights (Article 9-1 the right to receive information; Article 10 the 
right to free association; Article 11 the right to assemble freely with others; 
Article 12 the right to freedom of movement and residence; Article 13 the 
right to participate freely in the government; and Article 14 the right to 
property “which may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need 
or in the general interest of the community”).  
Article 30 of the Charter authorized an African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights “to promote human and peoples’ rights and 
ensure their protection in Africa” (OAU, 1982). Notwithstanding, the human 
rights’ reports on the commitment of African states to the Charter’s 
fundamental rights and genuine freedoms documented the poor application 
of obligations. The Commission’s records implicated a dire need to find the 
principled leaders who could only be tested by consistent democratic 
programs in the political, cultural, and educational arenas (Mahmoud, 2005). 
None of these was reliably applied as military coups and corrupted 
governments perpetuated the authority-made leaderships. “African leaders 
admit that the major reason for Africa’s social, political, and economic crisis 
is bad leadership… Kofi Anan, a former Secretary General of the United 
Nations from Ghana, was blunt in advising African chiefs to stop blaming 
colonial powers and colonialism for Africa’s ineffective leaders, political and 
economic woes, and current level of underdevelopment” (Udogu, 2016:2). 
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“Although the Banjul Charter makes a significant contribution to the 
human rights corpus, it creates an ineffectual enforcement system. Its most 
notable contributions are the codification of the three "generations" of rights, 
including the innovative concept of peoples' rights, and the imposition of 
duties on individuals… the weaknesses in the African system  include the 
"clawback" clauses in the African Charter, the potential abuse of the 
language of duties, and the absence of an effective protection mandate for 
the African Commission… demands for more open political societies may 
augur well for the protection of civil and political rights. In this context, the 
African Human Rights Court is likely to operate states themselves” (Mutua, 
2000:38). Following a short period of democratic governments in Nigeria, 
Sudan, Namibia, Malawi, Benin, South Africa, Tanzania, and Mali that were 
enthusiastically received by the masses as promising anti-colonial systems of 
rule, the lacking of confidence between people and government never 
stopped.  
Colonialism undoubtedly laid the foundation of this situation through 
the injustices colonial authorities developed when they ruled the continent. 
The nationalist governments were blamed for the development failures, 
authority abuse, and a wide range of gross human rights violations against 
the Africans. Governments failed to make peace with the people by 
authoritative governance. Nobel Laurette Woll Soyinka (1975) criticized the 
severe repercussions of state intrusions in the peaceful competition for 
power: “the king has died, and his horseman is expected by law and custom 
to commit suicide and accompany his ruler to heaven.” The human rights’ 
situation was appalling throughout the post-independence period. In the 
1980s, Africa resisted by both civilian and armed struggles the dictators who 
clothed military tyrannies with single-party single-candidate presidential 
systems in almost every part of the continent.  
The records of most state leaderships in and after the Cold-War Era 
antagonized the meaningful principles that the independence forefathers 
inculcated meticulously in the histories of independence. “Democracy hinges 
on 1) a principled allowance by states for the popular participation of civil 
society in national decision making; and 2) a constant commitment by both 
state and civil society to demonstrate government systems and societal life.” 
But the momentum of democratic transition unfolded in a new pattern of 
authoritarianism rather than stable democracy: By the 1990s, “the reality of 
state interference in academic or private freedoms, excessive use of force, 
and unlawful violence characterized the performance of many African 
governments” (Mahmoud: 2005:19). The situation was further worsened by 
the tendency of central governments to marginalize the countryside with 
uneven development, underdevelopment, and a complete negligence of 
modern services and amenities.  
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In Nigeria, Sudan, Gambia, and Niger, as well as Mauritania and 
Tunisia, security leaders replaced democratic rule by rituals of self-appointed 
institutions. The transition of Gambia to elected leadership was ‘extremely 
flawed.’ “Having promoted himself from lieutenant to colonel after the 
military coup of July 1994, Jammeh announced through the commission of 
gross human rights violations, intimidation, and persecution of political 
opponents the beginning of a new era of freedom, progress, democracy, and 
accountability” (John A. Wiseman, 1998:65-75). In the late 1990s, political 
analysts were wondering whether “President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, 
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, President Asias Afewerki of 
Eritrea, and Vice President and Defense Minister – and de facto head of 
government – Paul Kagame of Rwanda represent African solutions to 
African domestic and regional problems, or are they a new African 
problem?… Their plea that the international community should understand 
the special problems their countries face and allow them to blaze their own 
path to democracy can be interpreted as a realistic assessment but also as a 
weak excuse for authoritarianism” (Ottaway, 1998:199; cited in Mahmoud, 
2005:40).  
Another side of failure pertained to a cult of leadership apart from the 
leader’s competencies. Ali Mazrui’s analysis of this phenomenon illuminated 
“the tendency towards monarchism and the personality cult among some 
African leaders has hindered the development of strong public institutions… 
in terms of four factors: the quest for aristocratic effect, the personalization 
of authority, the sacralization of authority, and the quest for a royal historical 
identity - The personality cult often leads to the destruction of the opposition 
and the subsequent weakening of democratic institutions… Ali Mazrui 
appreciates Nkrumah’s vision for Africa and his ability to inspire Ghanaian 
nationalism. He views Nkrumah as an exemplary leader who had great goals 
and who could design appropriate strategies for realizing some of his goals… 
he also sees him as a leader who lost the vision for his country because he 
was wrapped up in the personality cult. For Mazrui, Julius Nyerere of 
Tanzania was “an exemplary figure who shied away from the personality 
cult. He admires Nyerere’s originality of thought, intellectual stature, self-
effacing character and consistent support for the pan-Africanist dream. But 
he was critical of Nyerere’s anti-intellectual policies and experiment with 
socialism” (Mazrui and Mutunga, 2003:4-6).  
These criticisms did not deny the great efforts of the Continent’s 
national liberation leaders who moved Africa into a path of development 
commensurate with the needs and aspirations of the rural populations and the 
deprived residents of the cities. It was Kwame Nkrumah, Ahmed Sékou 
Touré, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta, Ahmed Ben 
Bella, Nelson Mandela and Patrice Lumumba, as well as political theorists of 
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the caliber of Amilcar Cabral, ‘Abd al-Khaliq Mahgoub, Ali Mazrui, and 
Gilbert Rodney together with leading Africans in the Diaspora led by Marcus 
Garvey, W. B. Du Bois, Martin Luther King, Jr., El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz 
[Malcolm X], and a great many leaders of the Civil Rights’ Movement in the 
United States who stood firmly against racism and oppression for the cause 
of justice and human rights and the social progression of African peoples all 
over the world. 
Civil Society, Human Rights, and Globalization: The demise of the 
continent’s slow growth, heavy external debt, and state corruption had gone 
a long way by the tragic absence of the 1960s liberation mode and ethical 
commitments to the needy populations. African people were made to live in 
poverty-stricken situations that inhibited their access to the amenities and 
modern facilities. Poverty in Africa was a result of misguided development 
to increase wealth of the rich. The emphasis of the state on capital-intensive 
orientations, private land ownership, and large-scale mechanization, instead 
of labor-intensive traditions, community cooperatives and extended family 
systems, generated long-standing conflicts between peoples and 
governments, nomads and farmers, rural inhabitants and urbanites. 
Development disputes were often escalated into violent ethnic and regional 
feuds and/or political conflicts ensuing in huge losses of lives and property 
and violating gravely the rights of women and children (Bukuku & 
Mahmoud, 1989:117-134).  
The African civil societies became a popular force in the continent’s 
striving to force a democratic path of development to protect the human 
rights. “There is now a very large and informal worldwide network of human 
rights NGO’s, who exchange information about individuals’ cases and 
patterns of violations. The two most developed organizations in this field are 
Amnesty International and the ‘Americas Watch’ organizations… many 
other organizations including national organizations make their own 
contribution” (MacDermot, 1989:50). “Within states, non-governmental 
organizations have multiplied during that period and governments are being 
forced to revise policies and laws that are offensive to basic human rights. At 
the continental level, NGOs and human rights advocates have demanded that 
the African Commission become part of this movement towards change. 
This is the lens through which Africans now view the African human rights 
system” (Mutua, 2000:38).  
The Maputo Declaration issued by African Civil Society 
Organizations to the Second Summit of the Heads of States and 
Governments of the African Union, Maputo, Mozambique, 4th-12th July 
2003 conveyed a strong critique of the continent’s development: “We are 
deeply concerned about the continued imposition and adoption of neo-liberal 
policies that continue to impoverish the African people; the continued gross 
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violation of human and economic rights especially in Zimbabwe, Swaziland, 
Liberia, Cote D'Ivoire, Burundi, Sudan, Uganda, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Somalia, Nigeria, Western Sahara amongst others; the civil strife and 
armed conflict in the continent; the deteriorating terms of trade within the 
continent; lack of access, deterioration and privatization of basic social 
services such as water, energy, health and education; [and] the 
erosion/neglect of African cultural heritage.”  
The NGOs Declaration raised a great outcry against “the ballooning 
levels of internal and external debt; the lack of political will to resolve the 
exploitation and mismanagement of natural resources in particular energy, 
water, minerals, flora and fauna and marine resources; and the plundering, 
mismanagement, removal of local resource management.” The NGOs 
reechoed the long-standing struggles of the Continent to remove among other 
pandemics “and lack of benefit sharing, through inter alia biopiracy, 
promotion of genetically modified organisms and patents on life and life 
processes; lack of corporate accountability by transnational corporations; the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic and other diseases such as malaria, TB and its socio-
economic implications particularly for orphans and children and elderly in 
Africa; and the lack of collective and concrete actions to resolve the land 
issues in Africa” (Maputo Declaration, 2003). 
The post-independence decades experienced widespread 
governmental paternalism that failed to transform the backward economies 
to efficient systems of production by rapid economic growth. A main reason 
for this failure was the negligence of many national and international 
development policy-makers to the African traditional economic, political, 
social and cultural realities. Contrary to the bureaucratic impositions and the 
paternalistic prescriptions of external sources, African indigenous 
orientations reinforced the integration of the social structure through 
cooperation, pluralism, collective bargaining, and compromise. These same 
value-orientations have been largely compatible with different forms of 
political pluralism, public freedoms, trade unionism, and international human 
rights’ norms (Bukuku & Mahmoud, 1989). 
In the current globalization epoch, African values “have been 
deteriorating as a result of interventionist policies and practices seeking to 
achieve rapid economic growth in terms of high rates of GDP by the 
adoption of large-scale mechanized agriculture, etc., at the expense of the 
indigenous social life” (Mahmoud, 2005:21-22). Because the negativities of 
African development were largely founded on the leadership failures to 
strike fair agreements with foreign investments in the service of the 
indigenous population, following sections touched upon the extent and 
volume of global investments in the continent. This was an indicator of the 
emptiness of African treasuries from essential priorities to ensure the public 
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prosperity. Due to an uninterrupted process of depleting Africa from 
resources by profiteering economies via unprincipled national and external 
beneficiaries, the total dispossession of the indigenous living standards and 
resources led to unrelenting violence and civil wars. “Africa entered the 
twenty-first century saddled with …brain drain… political violence, 
repression of human rights and the lack of a productive professional and 
technological environment” (Economic Commission for Africa, 2009:277). 
The African NGOs and human rights’ groups called on the African 
Heads of states and governments to “Recognize, engage, and utilize 
indigenous knowledge systems inherent and intrinsic to the poor and resides 
amongst them.  This is as a means to involve the poor in social and economic 
upliftment processes by investing in them as a resource of development; 
Fight corruption and pursue good economic governance and make aid more 
responsive to development needs through the establishment of a joint civil 
society - government forum to engage donors and development partners; 
Respect the commitments made and agreed to, for the effective popular 
participation and promotion of human rights and democracy as enshrined in 
the international and national conventions; Develop democratic and 
autonomous local level institutions involved in land acquisition, allocation, 
conflict resolution and land management; Formulate natural resources 
management policies and legal frameworks that ensure improved access to 
land, forests, wildlife, water, fisheries and mineral resources by the rural 
communities” (Maputo Declaration, 2003). 
The African NGOs and human rights’ groups called on the African 
Heads of states and governments to “Recognize, engage, and utilize 
indigenous knowledge systems inherent and intrinsic to the poor and resides 
amongst them.  This is as a means to involve the poor in social and economic 
upliftment processes by investing in them as a resource of development; 
Fight corruption and pursue good economic governance and make aid more 
responsive to development needs through the establishment of a joint civil 
society - government forum to engage donors and development partners; 
Respect the commitments made and agreed to, for the effective popular 
participation and promotion of human rights and democracy as enshrined in 
the international and national conventions; Develop democratic and 
autonomous local level institutions involved in land acquisition, allocation, 
conflict resolution and land management; Formulate natural resources 
management policies and legal frameworks that ensure improved access to 
land, forests, wildlife, water, fisheries and mineral resources by the rural 
communities” (Maputo Declaration, 2003). 
Here, the socialist thinker Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud affirmed: “In the 
last three decades common legitimate claims crystallized [to apply] a) United 
Nations’ resolution on the reduction of advanced nation’s armament by a 
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specific percentage of the revenue to assist the less developed countries; b) 
Exemption of the 20 poorest states of debt, and the search for better 
conditions of borrowing; c) Prohibition of the sale and export of arms to the 
20 poorest states provided that the share of defense and security must not 
exceed a certain percentage of the GNP; d) Commitment of international 
capital to reinvest part of its profits in Third World Countries (TWCs); e) 
Commitment of international capital with increasing input of mid and 
advanced technology; [and] f) Commitment of international capital to train 
national caliber” (Nugud, 1997; cited in Mahmoud, 2007:215). 
There was hardly a truer source than the UN’s specialized agencies to 
provide evidence for this analysis: for one, the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) cautioned from “perceived risks and regulatory 
uncertainty in a fragile world economy… Flows to Africa…fell. At the same 
time, East and South-East Asia and Latin America experienced strong 
growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. New global forms of FDI 
include state-owned enterprises which indicate ‘control’ as well as 
‘ownership.’ Investment liberalization and promotion remained the 
dominant element of recent investment policies (emphasis in the original). 
Nevertheless, the risk of investment protectionism has increased as 
restrictive investment measures and administrative procedures accumulated 
over the past years” (UNCTAD, 2013:XI). 
In the processes of this globalization of world economies, Africa, as 
one of the “poorest regions,” fell repeatedly prey to the hegemonic control 
and ownership of Multi-National Corporations via uninterrupted modes of 
foreign domination over African national or continental interests, asserted 
UNCTAD. “International production is expanding, with foreign sales, 
employment and assets of transnational corporations (TNCs) all increasing 
[emphasis in the original]: TNCs production worldwide generated value-
added of approximately $16 trillion in 2010, about a quarter of global GDP. 
State-owned TNCs are an important emerging source of FDI. The ownership 
and governance of State-owned TNCs have raised concerns in some host 
countries regarding, among others, the level playing field and national 
security, with regulatory implications for the international expansion of these 
companies” (UNCTAD). The rapidly growing Middle-Eastern investors 
were closely involved in the whereabouts of this globalization of which a 
consequent section analyzed major aspects in Africa. It was therefore 
necessary to focus on the bureaucratic structures of the Gulf rich states that 
overwhelmed poor African states with prodigal finances. 
 
The Arab Governance and Bureaucratic Structures   
The success or failure of a state democratic performance (based on 
separate branches of government with competent legislative and executive 
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bodies and independent judiciary) would have to be evaluated by an overall 
assessment of the structure, functioning, and performance of the state’s 
bureaucracy (el-Kikhia, 1997). Additionally, there was a need to clarify the 
historical roots of the bureaucratic structure, the leadership and personnel 
issues, the law that governed state systems, and the response of the public 
that received and followed up with feedback on bureaucratic instructions. 
Few studies unraveled the complexities of this performance. The evaluation 
of bureaucratic structures was not solely based on the bureaucracy per se, 
whether it functioned under a dictatorship or a democracy. It was equally 
important to research the societal factors that influenced the bureaucratic 
process, the public mode, political awareness, and ethno-religious 
preferences. The societal factors, in their turn, influenced the roles that the 
public played to support the bureaucracy, democratize the performance, or 
ostracize the bureaucratic structure all together.  
As of yet, the concern for public roles in the Arab States’ center-
region dichotomy had not been intricately examined by democracy research; 
but the main strategies to control society were typically associated with the 
Arab Ruling Elite (ARE) manipulations of the state and business. Because 
the perfect bureaucracy existed only in the minds of philosophers, the 
performance of bureaucratic structures was never saved from failures or 
abuses of authority. The Gulf States restricted researchers from studying the 
government-citizen relationships; even formal information was hardly 
released to capture the extent to which a state could be favorable to people, 
judged by judicial and parliamentary competencies over executive 
performance. Thanks to a few independent works that applied professional 
and academic criteria, besides the International Internet which opened some 
blocked areas for millions of readers who were able to look into the views 
and criticisms of Gulf writers on the states and their internal affairs.  
The Peninsula States constituted a genuine part of the Arab League. 
Ruling over large Muslim societies with ethno-tribal cultures, the power 
issues between the ARE and these structures were mostly based on the 
recognition of this reality. In modern times, the globalization of Arab 
societies, in general, and the Gulf States, in particular, brought to the surface 
dilemmas of modernity and the challenges of adjusting state bureaucracies to 
the moral values and social expectations of the Bedouin dominion. The 
dilemma of enhancing state-public relationships by non-democratic 
bureaucracies increased the challenges of political power in the midst of 
religious, cultural, and tribal pressures. “Autocratic regimes like those in 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Gulf States and Emirates found 
themselves exposed to assaults from so-called “progressive,” though 
essentially not less authoritarian” (Rejwan, 1998:103). Still, the pursuit for a 
viable system of administration between central governments and regional 
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locations developed a long-standing demand by democratic forces and civil 
society groups vis-à-vis the power monopolies of competing sheikhs or 
family-controlled parties.  
In the post-independent decades of the Arab states in Africa and the 
Middle East, a nationalist model of the state was projected by growing civil 
society groups to process popular participation in decision making and 
development administration. In succeeding decades, the civic groups seldom 
secured organizational activities versus the ARE reluctance to ease the grip 
of power. In the meantime, socialist ideologies advocated progressive 
economic, political, and cultural programs to popularize the state by 
transitional governments whose popular programs were mockingly wiped out 
by succeeding single-party single-candidate systems of rule. Armed 
confrontations occurred between the ARE and contending groups. By the 
end of the Cold War Era, the public yearning to establish democratic secular 
states to implement necessary reforms on the center-region relations, to 
eradicate all forms of discrimination against the women, and to implement 
democratization agenda in the national sphere was forcibly oppressed by 
ARE alliances with anti-democratic conservatives and Jihadist groups. 
Thenceforth, the political conflict was polarized by the striving of Jihadist 
forces to seize the state power in their own right, regardless of former 
alliances with the ARE.  
In the 2000 decades, the Gulf conservativeness was actively 
manipulated in varying degrees by the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi 
Jihadist militant groups: “As a result, governments in Bahrain and Kuwait 
have tended to treat Salafi groups similarly to the way they deal with the 
Muslim Brotherhood. In Qatar and the UAE, Brotherhood and Salafi 
branches exert influence on government policymaking, particularly in the 
social realm, through informal means or through government granted 
bureaucratic posts. Because these states lack legislative elections, 
policymaking remains centralized, leading rulers either to attempt to co-opt 
or crack down on independent political and social movements… even on 
informal Islamist activity, while the Qatari government has historically been 
more receptive to Islamist complaints in the realm of social policies and 
allows Islamists to remain working within the bureaucracy” (Freer, 2016:1).  
Pursuing national interests with opposition groups, nonetheless, the 
emerging civil societies acted patiently towards the ARE leaderships, which 
hardly insured equal political or economic benefits to the rural people or 
recognized the right of urban communities to enjoy equal representation in 
the national decision-making. This attitude differentiated the Gulf curbed 
formulations from the liberality of the African confrontationist societies. 
Academic investigation confirmed that “civic organizations in Qatar 
represent traditional, non-democratic forms of societal involvement — 
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opportunities to build broader connections, to have a life outside the home, 
but not opportunities to learn about and experience democratic politics or to 
mobilize support for particular policies.…Civic participation on its own will 
not lead Qataris toward more democratic orientations such as political trust, 
social tolerance or support for a democratic political system. It is precisely 
those who least value and least understand democracy — and who most 
benefit from the political status quo — that tend to be most actively involved 
in civil society” (Gengler et al, 2011) 
A clearer portrayal of change appeared in this analysis: “globalization 
patterns add a potentially destabilizing dimension to the interdependencies 
that have long bound the Gulf States to the international community. 
Increasingly these new linkages bypass state structures and control and 
constitute both an ideational and material threat to their politics” (Ulrichsen: 
2015:1-2). Stressing the “inequalities and security challenges” in Bahrain, 
Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, and Qatar in the Gulf post-oil era, the 2011 Arab 
Spring’s “civil uprisings shook the political economy of authoritarian state 
structures across the Arab world… states in transition are more vulnerable to 
predatory political violence and challenges to regime legitimacy.” The 
political economy of Egypt and Tunisia uprisings was evident in the Gulf 
States, including “bulging young populations, high youth unemployment and 
unbalanced labor markets, and authoritarian regimes reluctant to open up to 
meaningful political reform. An example is unemployment among Saudi 
nationals between the ages 20-24, which was a reported 38.4 per cent in 
2008, with the figure rising to 72 per cent for women alone” (Ulrichsen, 
2015:180).  
The Human Rights’ Situation: As in Africa, the excessive 
centralization of power failed to place the needs of rural population as the 
chief agenda of development administration. The politics of development 
ascertained in most Arab societies the same trend of exclusionary policies 
towards the civil society, the Kurds, Berbers, Nubians, Shiite, and Christian 
minorities, and the African and Asian emigrants. The dispute between state 
bureaucracies and popular movements was escalated by suppression of the 
public freedoms, which disabled democratic growth and even development. 
It also gave rise to prevailing religious intolerance, as well as irreconcilable 
confrontations between independent liberal oppositions and the state 
coalitions with Jihadist groups. The ARE security actions to restrain labor 
unions and professional associations exacerbated hostilities of the rural 
leaderships that inevitably joined the urbanite struggles for equity and human 
rights.  
The report on Qatar 2016 human rights showed that “The principal 
human rights problems were the inability of citizens to choose their 
government in free and fair periodic elections, restriction of fundamental 
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civil liberties, and denial of the rights of foreign workers. The monarch-
appointed government prohibited organized political parties and restricted 
civil liberties, including freedoms of speech, press, and assembly and access 
to a fair trial for persons held under the Protection of Society Law and the 
Combating Terrorism Law. Other continuing human rights concerns 
included restrictions on the freedoms of religion and movement, since 
migrant workers could not freely travel abroad. Legal, institutional, and 
cultural discrimination against women limited their participation in society. 
Trafficking in persons, primarily in the domestic worker and labor sectors, 
was a continuing problem. The noncitizen “bidoon” (stateless persons) who 
resided in the country with unresolved legal status experienced social 
discrimination. The government took limited steps to prosecute those who 
committed abuses” (U.S. Department of State, 2016:1). 
The Saudi Arabia 2015 Human Rights Report stated that “The most 
important human rights problems reported included citizens’ lack of the 
ability and legal means to choose their government; restrictions on universal 
rights, such as freedom of expression, including on the internet, and the 
freedoms of assembly, association, movement, and religion; and pervasive 
gender discrimination and lack of equal rights that affected all aspects of 
women’s lives. Other human rights problems reported included a lack of 
equal rights for children and noncitizen workers; abuses of detainees; 
overcrowding in prisons and detention centers; a lack of judicial 
independence and transparency that manifested itself in denial of due process 
and arbitrary arrest and detention; investigating, detaining, prosecuting, and 
sentencing lawyers, human rights activists, and antigovernment reformists; 
holding political prisoners; and arbitrary interference with privacy, home, 
and correspondence. Violence against women; trafficking in persons; and 
discrimination based on gender, religion, sect, race, and ethnicity, as well as 
a lack of equal rights for children and noncitizen workers were common. 
Lack of governmental transparency and access made it difficult to assess the 
magnitude of many reported human rights problems.” (U. S. Department of 
State, 2016:1).  
In the Human Rights Report 2016 of the United Arab Emirates: “The 
following human rights problems exist or were reported: no citizens' right to 
change the government and no popularly elected representatives of any 
kind; flogging as judicially sanctioned punishment; arbitrary 
detention; incommunicado detention permitted by law;  questionable 
independence of the judiciary; restrictions on civil liberties--freedom of 
speech and of the press, and assembly; restrictions on right of association, 
particularly for human rights groups; restrictions on religious 
freedom; domestic abuse of women, sometimes enabled by 
police;  trafficking in women and children; legal and societal discrimination 
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against women and noncitizens; corruption and lack of government 
transparency; abuse of foreign domestic servants; restrictions on and abuses 
of workers' rights. The government has made steady progress in addressing 
the problem of trafficking of women in the sex trade and children in the 
camel racing industry. In July, the government enacted a law, immediately 
enforceable, criminalizing the participation of children under age 18 in camel 
racing… In December, President Khalifa announced, and the Supreme 
Ruling Council endorsed, a decision to indirectly elect half of the 
consultative FNC” (U.S. Department of State. 2016). 
“Gulf countries saw their already low press freedom index rankings 
slip further in 2016, in a report put together by media watchdog group 
Reporters Without Borders (RWB).  Journalists in the Gulf continued to 
work in a stifling environment of censorship, where authorities often 
intervene directly or indirectly in their work. Saudi Arabia had the worst 
record for press freedoms in the Gulf region, which saw their ranking slip 
one place to 165 in the world. In comparison, Mauritania - at rank 48 - had 
the [freest] press in the Arab world. Near the bottom of the rankings was 
Syria at 177, where an active rebellion against a brutal dictatorial regime is 
ongoing and has seen it retain the title of worst press freedoms in the Arab 
world. Despite a change of administration, Saudi Arabia continues to have 
one of the most restricted media environments in the world, a Freedom 
House report said this year. Although social media has provided a conduit 
for access to news "it too is being suppressed as the government seeks 
to silence criticism of its domestic policies and its war in Yemen". Writers 
and activists critical of the Saudi government or who cover sensitive subjects 
such as Islam continue to face harsh punitive measures… The remaining 
Gulf Arab countries were ranked 103 (Kuwait), 117 (Qatar), 119 (UAE), 
Oman (125) and 162 (Bahrain)” (TheNewArab, 2016).  
To conclude, the curtailment of the minimum standards of public 
freedoms and human rights was a key factor of the ARE’s rejection of the 
public scrutiny of the disproportionate share of poor urbanites and rural 
people in the centralized administrations, the fountainhead of the crisis. This 
exclusion enforced protracted exploitation of the peripheries; the rural 
women were victimized by illiteracy, unpaid domestic labor, and multiple 
forms of discrimination; and the ARE/Jihadists’ negligence of even 
development became a prime mover of political resistance. A longstanding 
leadership cult in both African and Arab states (Siciolino, 1991; Ottaway, 
1998) escalated the turbulence by contradictory manipulations of religious 
laws and traditional cultures (Lapidus, 2002; Halliday, 2003; Hafez, 2003). 
The tragedy of this crisis was manifested in the ongoing civil wars of Syria, 
Iraq, Sudan, Libya, and the expanding Saudi-Yemeni warfare which might 
well spread over the vulnerable Gulf.  
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The Center-Region Perplex: As experienced in African states, 
tribalism, ethnicity, and regional alliances were intensively influenced in the 
Arab Peninsula by partisan motives. “The most common internal candidate 
for the specificity of the Middle East is, of course, Islam, but Arabism and 
tribal forms have also been cited,” asserted Bromley (1994:87). In addition 
to rivalries on the leadership of the Muslim world, internal instability 
correlated with unsettled political struggle. The center-region conflict 
introduced Iran as an external player in the Arab region. The fear of Iran 
expansionism escalated unrestrained war over every inch of the land between 
the Houthi/Salih forces and a Saudi alliance, which almost destroyed the 
entire country and civil life, with the post-Salih elected government, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), and western powers: “a proxy war, the stage in 
which Saudi Arabia tries to consolidate itself and fight Iran… exacting a 
terrible humanitarian cost with serious implications for regional stability. 
American, British, Canadian and French support for the operation continues, 
much to the outrage of human rights organizations worldwide” (Mijares, 
2017) “Roughly 10,000 people, including some 4,100 civilians, have died, 
3.2 million people (12 percent of the population) have been displaced, 
pestilence (in the form of Cholera) has hit the capital, and famine 
approaches, with more than half the population food insecure” (Bandow, 
2017). 
The touches of modernity with the region since colonial times did not 
ripen sustainable forms of democratic rule or even stable peace; and the 
drafting forms of bureaucratic recruitment by the Jihadist councils and/or 
state-financed businesses failed to function as replacements of modern 
parliamentary rule. In Qatar and Bahrain, the government agencies sided 
with the Jihadists and placed the civil society, the Sufi and secular thought 
under police surveillance. The crisis of non-democratic rule in the region was 
thus a crisis of both society and state. “Nearly every Arab state today has 
avoided the clear dichotomies of choice – such as religious versus secular in 
forging their political-cultural identities… each Arab state (or regime) has 
attempted its own reconciliation with great emphasis on one particular 
dimension but never to the total exclusion of the other” (Ibrahim, 1996:246). 
This analysis was evidently felt in the GCC defense of Qatar vis-à-vis 
Egypt’s mention of visits to Qatar by a Jihadist who blasted the Copts’ 
cathedral in Cairo (Alarabiya, 2016; Veto, 2016). Contrariwise, “a 
conference of local and international civil society organizations was hosted 
in Dubai on the role of civil society in the Arab Region in implementing 
2030 agenda for sustainable development” (Gulf Times, 2016).  
 Ironically, the sponsored militancy that aimed to establish theocratic 
rule in the targeted societies undermined the ARE plans to democratize the 
sponsoring state. As the interventionist actions backfired, the ARE was 
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forced to sabotage the political awareness of their own countrymen about the 
Jihadist antagonisms that disturbed the social life and worsened the 
marginality of minorities. A possible seizure of political power by theocratic 
organizations escalated the ARE fear for loss of power. The ARE were thus 
caught in the middle of the conflict, which resulted in gross violations 
against the lives and property of political opponents. The Jihadist militias in 
the post-Qaddafi Libya, post-Mubarak Egypt, Bashar allies in Syria, and 
Bashir security forces in Sudan provided stunning examples of this 
disruption which amounted to street wars in cities and the house-to-house 
bombing of children and women, the most appalling victimology of war.  
The striving of Saudi Arabia to enhance decentralization, “will be a 
complicated challenge to move both toward centralization and 
decentralization at the same time,” predicted Dahlan (1990:61). The first 
Saudi Shura Council was established in 1924. “The council consisted of 
twelve members. At that time, when the state structure was not completed, 
the council was entrusted with drafting the basic laws for the administration 
of the country… there was no law to specify the functions of the council. 
However, that council continued for six months. After the Kingdom achieved 
enormous progress in development, the Custodian of the Two Holy 
Mosques, the late King Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz introduced three major laws: 
the Basic Law of Governance, the Provincial Councils' Law, and the Majlis 
Ash-Shura Law. The modernization of Majlis Ash-Shura was considered to 
be [an] update to what had already existed by enhancing the council's 
frameworks, methods, and means and injecting efficiency, organization, and 
vitality into them… In the fourth term, the council consisted of a speaker and 
150 members, representing people of knowledge, experience, and 
competence” (The Shura Council, 2016).  
“In December [2015] the country held elections on a nonparty basis 
for two-thirds of the 2,106 seats on the 284 municipal councils around the 
country. Independent polling station observers identified no significant 
irregularities with the election. For the first time, women were allowed to 
vote and run as candidates. Civilian authorities generally maintained 
effective control over the security forces” (U.S. Department of State, 2016). 
Some critics wrote about the decision of the Council to increase the salaries 
of retired military ranks. Several commentators complained from 
bureaucratic routine and indicated dissatisfaction for the biased selectivity of 
the Council’s decisions and the one or two years’ negligence of appeals to 
increase salaries for other employees of the state in “a time of price-rise and 
a very big change of living conditions.” ARE transformed the administrative 
and financial systems to a tool in the service of personal interests to suppress 
the lower echelons of the bureaucracy, the indigenous farmers and workers, 
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and the expatriates’ wage-labor, Internet free-lance Gulf writers claimed 
(Hawamir alBorasa Alsoudiya, 2016). 
The human rights’ performance in many African and Arab states 
discredited them from the high-esteemed membership of the United Nations 
Human Rights’ Council (UNHRC), overseer of the member States’ 
commitments to human rights and protector of the international norms. “As 
the U.N. prepares to elect 14 nations to its highest human rights body, a 21-
page joint NGO report was published by UN Watch, Human Rights 
Foundation and the Raoul Wallenberg Center for Human Rights. The 
findings were that China, Cuba, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Malaysia 
and Rwanda, are “Not Qualified” under the U.N.’s own membership criteria. 
The qualifications of Guatemala, South Africa and Tunisia were deemed 
“questionable” based on problematic human right records or in their UN 
voting records” (UN Watch, 2016).  
An overall comparison on the structures and policies that governed 
the post-colonial African and Arab states indicated they were founded by 
oppressive power relations that alienated the ruling elites from the ruled 
citizens, and offered disproportionate access to the national resources for 
abusive businesses and external investors. Regardless of differences between 
legislative elections and civic experiences in African states, compared to 
poor experiences in the Gulf, the post-independence governments inhibited 
liberal political groups and civil society associations from national decision-
making. In the absence of popular leaderships strongly committed to people, 
the Arab and the African states failed to handle the center-periphery 
democratic governance. Mindful of these commonalities, the next section 
analyzed major aspects of the businesses that boomed in the present time 
between the Gulf expanding investment in the lands, minerals, and labor of 
Africa and the poor African economies and autocratic regimes, 
commissioners of the new sponsors. 
 
The Gulf investments in Africa  
Mirna Sleiman (2013) noted that “wealthy Gulf Arab companies are 
boosting their investment in Africa’s vast lands and untapped resources.” 
Affirming positive motives “including Africa fast economic growth, the rise 
of a free-spending African middle class, and a sense that much of the 
continent is becoming better government and more stable politically… 
Africa is a source of food and arable land, and it is launching an 
infrastructure building boom that recalls the Gulf’s own construction spree in 
the past decade.” The writer then emphasized that “Africa is becoming more 
interesting because of the natural resources it has, its demographics and 
better governance” (Reuters, 2013).  
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This auspicious evaluation by Gulf investors did not overlap with 
realities of the African socio-political and economic life. What appeared 
factual were the UNCTAD bare facts about non-equity investments in the 
poorest regions of the world that supplied huge surpluses to the investing 
firms’ vis-à-vis African states and private businesses. Moreover, “The 
Middle East’s oil exporters posted a combined surplus in goods and services 
of about $400 billion last year [2012], the International Monetary Fund 
estimates. Much of that money is being ploughed back into foreign assets; 
while the bulk still goes into Western assets such as U.S Treasury bonds, 
more is going to emerging markets such as Africa. Annual trade between the 
Middle East and Africa has grown fivefold to $49 billion over the past 
decade, from $10 billion in 2002, according to Standard Chartered Bank” 
(Seliman, 2013). 
Linguistic, cultural and political ties centered the Gulf investment in 
North Africa. “Increasingly, Gulf investors are venturing into sub-Saharan 
Africa. Dubai port now runs the port of Dakar in Senegal and port operations 
in Mozambique, Algeria and Djibouti. In addition to Egypt and Nigeria, 
[UAE] Etisalat operates in about six countries in West Africa, as well as 
Tanzania and Sudan. [Despite these monopolies and profits, a complaint by 
Eitsalat chief executive says] the record of its African investments has not so 
far been impressive, partly because of fierce competition from other 
operators… Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been buying large areas of 
farmland overseas to ensure access to food supplies. Qatar’s Hassad Food 
agreed in 2009 on a $1 billion farmland development joint venture with the 
government of Sudan” (Seliman, 2013). “The state and Saudi business 
concerns have already made a combined investment of more than $11bn in 
agricultural ventures across a number of countries, including Brazil, Canada, 
Ukraine, Ethiopia and Sudan” (Oxford Business Group, 2013). 
A “risk involving Gulf States in the socio-political and water scarcity 
problems of African countries, if they displace local people from their land 
or disrupt local farming patterns” (Oxford Business Group, 2013) voiced 
loudly in the continent from many farming groups. The investors were quite 
insensitive to the culture and value-orientations of the natives. As a Gulf top 
executive put it, “We like to invest in commodities. Since 2002, the 
commodity price trend keeps going up. May be 2016 and 2017 might create 
a gap between supply and demand that might push the price even higher up. 
Our strategy is simple: we are opportunistic… If there is an opportunity in 
Rwanda, we will go to Rwanda,” said Hussain al-Abdulla, Qatar Investment 
Authority (QIA's) executive board member (Regan Doherty, 2012). 
For many observers, the newcomer investors resembled an effective 
successor of the colonial models that suppressed the popular demands to 
maintain private gain – in both cases nothing was felt by the broader public 
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as improvements in the workaday life or the future. While Zimbabwe 
redistributed land ownership to allow decent life to the bulk population, the 
farmers of the public-owned giant Gazira Agricultural Scheme in Sudan 
were stripped of the Scheme’s contractual rights by privatization projects. 
The railways, civil and agricultural engineering structures, ginning mills, and 
research centers were liquidated without fair consultations with or 
compensations to the farmers as a founding partner (Agricultural Engineers’ 
Group, 2009:9; SHRO Taayush, 2009:16). The government ventured with 
“The International Islamic Movement represented by Turkish, Iranian, 
Egyptian, and other companies… 59% of the Gazira and Manaqil state-
owned areas that the government intended to sell to the Islamist investors 
had been registered for farmers since eighty years ago” (International 
Campaign to Defend the Gazira and Manaqil, 2011:186).  
The popular resistance to “land acquisitions by foreigners” was a 
clear reflection of the FDI/TNC domination of the industrial, oil, 
agricultural, and service sectors of the national economies. The bragging 
statements of finance and agriculture officials in several African states about 
“opportunistic business” by lucrative deals for a promising coverage of food 
and employment were belied by violent demonstrations in the streets of 
Nairobi, Cairo, Khartoum, and many cities protesting steeping scarcity of 
food and job opportunities at their end. Popular uprisings in Africa and the 
Middle East and similar movements in Brazil and Latin America exercised 
immense protests against deterioration of the public life, the high rates of 
unemployment, expatriation, brain drain, and financial corruption of the state 
– all were concrete symptoms of the morbid financial and economic policies 
of the ruling leaderships of the globalized systems.  
Interestingly, these disturbing businesses entailed further expanded 
frustrations in diplomatic terms. Years ago, Qatar made a pro-government 
political endeavor, sidelining the Sudanese democratic opposition, the 
African Union, and the sisterly neighborhoods of Sudan, namely Egypt and 
the IGAD, to resolve the Darfur crisis by sponsoring direct negotiations 
between Darfuri rebel groups and the Sudanese government under a hefty 
promise Qatar would contribute a billion dollar or so to rehabilitate Darfur. 
Neither the Qatari diplomacy nor her promised money ended the crisis which 
would only be solved by a national constitutional conference for all 
democratic forces of the country, Sudan government, AU, the UN, and the 
concerned regional and international powers to put to task the required 
transition to permanent peace and democratic rule. 
A most recent interruption of the Saudi-Egyptian cooperation was 
negatively linked to irreconcilable political differences between the two 
countries concerning a Saudi resolution to settle the Syrian crisis before the 
UN Security Council versus a competing Russian resolution that Egypt 
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supported, instead of the Saudi expectation. Qatar and Saudi criticized 
Egypt’s Vote (RT, 2016). The suspension of Saudi petroleum products to 
Egypt was then media-linked to the Security Council’s tensions (Orient Net, 
2016). “The two countries do not have the same priorities: the kingdom is 
mainly worried about the Iranian menace, while Egypt is bogged down in its 
war against terrorism in the Sinaï and against ISIS in Libya. And yet there is 
much to unite them, in particular their hostility towards the “Arab spring” 
and their commitment to regional “stability.” Thus they co-operate on the 
Palestinian question and also, more discreetly, work together to counter 
Iranian influence in the Horn of Africa, and particularly in Eritrea and Sudan. 
These maneuvers resulted in Khartoum and Teheran breaking off diplomatic 
relations earlier this year” Gresh (2016). Egypt’s “hostility towards the Arab 
spring,” nevertheless, was quite the opposite as the new government of 
Egypt was one of the major outcomes of the Arab spring. 
Sudan was actively engaged in large-scale investments with the Gulf 
businesses, in addition to bulky monetary dealings with the governments of 
Iran, China, and Turkey, including arms’ industry and shipments (Iran News 
Update, 2014). The non-censored deals elevated corruption of the 
government (ranking 173 of the 176 countries that International 
Transparency reported) and escalated further the ruling party’s acts of 
repression against the opposition to unprecedented levels of violence. Civil 
wars escalated in almost all parts of the country leading to the full separation 
of South Sudan, which engaged in a bitter Dinka-Nuer tribal armed striving 
for power, and alienated further the diverse population of the country by the 
center’s demagogic indoctrination. Of the worst, the war-mongering policies 
of the Jihadist regime expanded civil wars in its own territory; and then 
moved hurriedly to engage the Sudanese armed forces in military action in 
Yemen – a country having a long history of sisterly non-interventionist ties 
with Sudan. Yemen has been lately facing a politically motivated civil war, 
as Sudan itself suffered for decades with everlasting failure to make peace 
via military action. 
“The Sudanese government plans to transform the Nile, the only 
stretch of fertile land north of Khartoum, into a string of five reservoirs. Built 
by Chinese, German and French companies, the Merowe Dam was 
completed two years ago. The project doubled Sudan’s electricity generation, 
but displaced more than 50,000 people from the Nile Valley to arid desert 
locations. Thousands of people who refused to leave their homes 
were flushed out by the reservoir, and protests were violently suppressed… 
In 2007, China also voted in favor of the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples at the UN. This document stipulates that indigenous 
peoples have the right of consent regarding “any project affecting their lands. 
The Kajbar Dam, which is strongly opposed by the indigenous Nubian 
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population, violates the UN Declaration” (Bosshard, 2000). “In 2010, the 
Sudanese government awarded a $705 million, five-year contract to build the 
Kajbar Dam to the Chinese company Sinohydro, the world’s largest 
hydropower contractor. The affected communities and International Rivers 
have called on Sinohydro to withdraw from the Kajbar contract” 
(International Rivers, 2000).  
“Sudan and Saudi Arabia signed agreements on the finalizing of the 
Kajbar, Dal and El Shireig dams in northern Sudan and the cultivation of a 
million acres of farmland near Atbara... In July and August, the Central Bank 
of Sudan received a total of $1 billion from Saudi Arabia” (Dabanga, 2015). 
In the African water-abundant Nile land, the Saudis paid $1,000 an acre. In 
Southern California, they purchased an acre for $17,000, and paid almost 
$5,000 for an acre of “scarcely populated” water-disputable land in Arizona 
(Los Angeles Times, 2017). The Merowe and the Kajbar multibillion dollar 
dams were publicly disputed against loss of land and destruction of heritage 
by the Manasir and Nubian people, as well as environmentalist researchers: 
“The Kajbar and Dal projects are located in the lands of ancient Nubia. After 
large Nubian territories have already been lost to the reservoir of the Aswan 
Dam, construction of these new dams would bring the unique Nubian 
culture, which dates back over more than 5,000 years, closer to extinction. 
The affected people are strongly opposed to the construction of the Kajbar 
and Dal dams. They have warned that the projects could lead to a second 
Darfur conflict. The Sudanese government has cracked down harshly on 
their protests” (International Rivers, 2010). 
“On June 13, 2007…The protesters marched to the dam site to 
protest; after being hit by heavy tear gas, all of a sudden, live bullets were 
fired and Sid-Ahmed was the first victim to fall to the ground… ‘The 
agreement is on paper, but the reality is we have not been compensated for 
our land. We want to be resettled around the lake, but the government wants 
to resettle us far away,’ said Al-Rashid Al-Affendi, of the Executive 
Committee of the Manasir People Affected by the Merowe Dam, in an 
interview with Al-Monitor” (Reem Abbas, 2013). “In 2007, security forces 
killed four and injured at least 20 people who protested peacefully against 
the proposed Kajbar Dam. The UN Special Rapporteur on Sudan deplored 
the excessive force used against the Nubian population” (International 
Rivers, 2010). In 2013, the government “found considerable gold seams in 
the northern states… Sites of archeological importance were destroyed and 
high levels of cyanide and mercury found dumped during the extraction 
process… in the past five years Nubians in Kajbar have been losing their 
[palm] trees in suspicious circumstances. The Anti-Kajbar committee says 
that about 200,000 trees have been destroyed” (The Guardian, 2014). 
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In Tanzania and Ethiopia the negativity of foreign investments 
undermined the pharmaceutical local manufacturing by displacement 
strategies imposed largely upon the national markets, despite improvements 
in industry. “By 2009, Tanzania-based production was supplying an 
estimated 35% of a local medicines market worth about US$140 million, and 
rising medicines exports had reached almost US$8 million. A particular 
strength of the local firms was supply to the rural areas. In 2009, Tanzanian 
pharmaceutical production looked like a relative success story. Yet between 
2009 and 2013, this success story turned into rapid decline. By 2013, imports 
of pharmaceuticals had risen to US$286 million on the back of rising donor 
spending, while medicines exports had fallen to US$1.7 million. Donors 
such as the Global Fund procure a large share of medicines used in Tanzania. 
Their large scale tenders and the market entry requirement of product-by-
product WHO prequalification shuts out local firms from markets for HIV, 
TB and malaria drugs” (Tibandebage et al, 2016:42-52).  
Similar investments in Africa were detrimental to the African 
wellbeing and healthy production relations. United Arab Emirates and China 
reaped large investments in the pharmaceutical industry of Ethiopia. Even 
with achievements in the size, capacity, and quality of products, “there are 
outstanding issues to be addressed such as the low production capacity and 
overwhelming dependence on importation of medicines; shortage of 
qualified management and technical personnel; and inadequate continuing 
professional development for practicing professionals; conflicts of interest 
with the suppliers of raw materials in India and China (as they are producers 
of medicines, so they charge higher prices); … low manufacturing capacity 
and hence high production cost” (Gebre-Mariam et al, 2016:82-83).  
Recent analysis of Qatar’s investment diplomacy in Africa revealed 
that “Qatar wanted to exist geopolitically, mainly but not solely, vis-à-vis the 
Saudi neighbor... Qatar is achieving its objectives via its investment fund, 
Qatar Investment Authority, and its Al Jazeera news channel, but also 
through opening embassies on the five continents and developing Qatar 
Airway’s routes” (Benjamin Augé (2016:9). This study found “Qatar and the 
African countries are two worlds unfamiliar with each other… Relations are 
no longer straightforward between ambassadors from the African continent 
and the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs… it was sometimes extremely 
difficult to meet key people in institutions or Qatari ministries in Doha... 
Although it is easy to find North American or European specialists at the 
Ministry, African specialists are still very much lacking, and they appear as 
the poor relation of Qatari diplomacy, which admittedly, still has not really 
specified the goals to be achieved on the African continent.”  
Augé study concluded in the fact that “the lack of qualified civil 
servants and experts on Africa explains the relative lack of vision about an 
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area which Qatar could interact with more. The lack of risk-taking in terms 
of Qatari investments in Africa frequently highlights the lack of time and 
native staff to review the projects… The economic sectors, such as gas, oil, 
mining, banking, and agriculture are only subject to profitability. The 
security of food supplies is also a very important focus of the country.” The 
writer then advised, “The mediations that the country has undertaken alone, 
involving among others Darfur, have achieved rather mixed results, since it 
is not acceptable to pay the parties to achieve peace, a long-term process 
should be considered. Political partnerships are also to be looked for on the 
side of the major African powers, like South Africa and Nigeria, in order to 
facilitate discussions on conflicts and to find a common solution” (Augé, 
2016:25-26). 
Structural Defaults: Pointing to Asian investment strategies in 
Africa, especially China whose thirst to the black gold of Africa swept 
undoubtedly over the Communists’ socialist values, “We may continue to 
depict as foreign, the capital of some TWCs such as China, Malaysia, and the 
Arab Peninsula... capital globalization is seen in the hegemony of multi-
national corporations… International capital is a necessary development 
element. The question is, under what conditions: mutual benefit or 
exploitation of the economic surplus under the innovated term of 
Interdependence” (Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud, 1997; cited in Mahmoud, 
2007:212-3). The ongoing transactions generated lion shares to foreign 
investments via African commissioners in the public and the private sectors, 
while a few mutual benefits accrued to the public life often for interests of 
the ruling elites 
Yes, sections of the middle classes obtained some profits from shared 
ventures with foreign businesses, mostly through government bank loans and 
subsidies. This minimum was syphoned off to process development projects 
for political propaganda, including rigged elections. The alternative of this 
narrow-focused development might be logically developed into plans of 
action towards the achievement of equalitarian, productive, and most 
popularly oriented bonds. The prosperity of the middle class sections was 
more of a parasitic type of investment than real increases in the production 
inputs, means of production, or even increases in shareholdings with the 
foreign investor. The latter, unlike national investors, was fully protected 
from state taxation, shielded by international agreements, and motivated to 
profit, own, and control indigenous people and land. What else but neo-
colonialism! 
These policies scrapped the local entrepreneur and surrendered the 
national economies to a strong presence of foreign non-equalitarian 
relationships, which abused the continent’s resources, the unquestionable 
benefits of the African people. Africa revenues were deeply depleted by 
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external debt stocks and service: according to World Bank Statistics (2011), 
in Angola, for example, external debt stocks, public and publicly guaranteed 
(PPG) increased in billions of current US$ from 1.9 in 2008 to 2.0 in 2011. 
The total debt service decreased slightly in Kenya, Mauritius, Mali, Uganda, 
Zambia, and Algeria; but the debt service increased in Malawi (US$1.926 
billion, equivalent to 54% of GDP, compared to 33.6 of GDP in 2011); 
Angola (1.4 to 4.2); and Egypt (5.6 to 7.4) with the same trend in Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Sudan, and Tunisia.  
UNCTAD (2013) asserted, “In today’s world, policies aimed at 
improving the integration of developing economies into global value chains 
must look beyond FDI and trade [emphasis in the original]. Policymakers 
need to consider non-equity modes (NEMs) of international production, such 
as contract manufacturing… and other types of contractual relationship 
through which TNCs coordinate the activities of host country firms, without 
owning a stake in those firms… It is evident that ‘Cross-border NEM activity 
worldwide… is estimated to have generated over $2 trillion of sales in 2009. 
Contract manufacturing and services outsourcing accounted for $1.1–1.3 
trillion, franchising $330–350 billion, licensing $340–360 billion, and 
management contracts around $100 billion. In most cases, NEMs are 
growing more rapidly than the industries in which they operate” (UNCTAD, 
2013:XII).  
The UN report recognized the fact that “NEMs also pose risks for 
developing countries [emphasis in the original].” Employment in contract 
manufacturing could be highly cyclical and easily displaced. The value 
added contribution of NEMs might appear low if assessed in terms of the 
value captured out of the total global value chain. Concerns existed that 
TNCs might use NEMs to circumvent social and environmental standards. 
And to ensure success in long-term industrial development, developing 
countries needed to mitigate the risk of remaining locked into low-value-
added activities and becoming overly dependent on TNC-owned 
technologies and TNC-governed global value chains (UNCTAD, 2013). 
Seized by this global eminence with its vehemence to expand, 
overrun, and dominate by dependency policies the African development 
potentialities and prerogatives, as well as those of the “poorest countries” 
(irrespective of the material and moral obligations conferred on all nations 
by international human rights’ norms, besides the national and continental 
popular conditionality of processing these key transactions democratically), 
there was little doubt that corruption control would not be effectively 
enforced, as clearly documented by international transparency reports. 
African countries transparency reports indicated the prevalent corruption in 
African state bureaucracies. The Country Rank of 176 countries revealed that 
budget openness was scant or none with low scores, except for very few 
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countries, for example Tunisia, Uganda, Kenya, Madagascar, and Egypt. The 
majority of African countries maintained high financial corruption as they 
occupied in the top ranks the lowest scores amongst the total reported 
countries in the world (Table One). 
Table One 
African Countries Transparency Indicators 
                           __________________________________ 
Country     Rank   Score   GDP  Literacy% IMR 
____________________ US$b_____________ 
Rwanda       50       53        5.63    70.7       59.1 
Liberia         75      41    986.2m    59.1      73.6 
Tunisia        75       41      44.29     77.6      13.8 
Burkina F.   83      38        8.82       8.7       92.6 
Morocco      88      37      90.8       56.1       30.4 
Zambia        88      37      16.19     70.9       68.9 
Senegal        94      36      12.95                   49.8  
Djibouti       94      36        1.05                   73  
------------------------------------------------------- 
Tanzania    102      35      23.06     72.9      50        
Algeria       105      34    159.43    72.6       30.5  
Mali           105      34        9.25     26.2      99.2 
Ethiopia     113      33      82.90     29.8      67.8       
Egypt         118      32    218.89     66.4      18.6       
Madagas    118      32        8.72     64.5      43.1 
Sierra Leo  123      31        1.91                  40.9  
Mauritania 123      31       3.64     57.5       75.  
Mozambiq  123      31       9.59      55.1      92.2 
Togo           128      30       3.15      56          66 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Uganda      130       29      17.01     73.2        63 
Kenya        139       27      31.41      87          55.1 
Nigeria      139       27    193.67      60.8       88.4 
Cameroon  144       26      22.39     70.7        84.4 
Eritrea        150       25        2.12     66.6       42.3 
Guinea-Bis 150       25    878.52m                92  
Guinea        154                  4.51     39.5        81.2 
Angola        157       22    114.2      70           97.9 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Libya          160        21       62.36     88.9     13.4 
Dem.Cong  160        21       13.15     67      111.7 
Zimbabw    163        20         7.47     91        50.9 
Chad           165        19         7.59     33.6     98.9 
Burundi      165        19          1.61    66.6     87.8 
Sudan         173        13        62.05    86.7     70.2       
Somalia      174         8       917m                 108.3 
_______________________________________________________ 
 (Source: Financial Transparency Reports, 2012; author’s construction) 
 
Table Two 
Middle-Eastern Countries Transparency Indicators 
_________________________________________ 
Country  Rank  Score   GDP      Literacy   IMR    Corruption 
            US$b       %                       Percentile% 
________________________________________________ 
Saudi        66      44     434.57      86.1       15              62 
Qatar        27      68      98.31       94.7         6.7           91  
UAE         27      68    297.65       90            6.1           80  
_______________________________________________________ 
(Source: Financial Transparency Reports, 2012; author’s construction) 
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To compare to the investing Middle-Eastern States, Table Two on 
Saudi, Qatar, and UAE scores indicated a big gap in the rates of corruption 
control between the sending nations and the recipient African states. The 
Control of Corruption Rank percentile % in African countries (average less 
than 40%, as mentioned in the ITR, 2012) was incomparable with those of 
Qatar (91%), UAE (80%), and Saudi (62%). “A country’s or territory’s score 
indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 - 100, 
where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means it 
is perceived as very clean. A country’s rank indicates its position relative to 
the other countries and territories included in the index” (Transparency 
International, 2012). 
To sum up, capitalism’s opponents envisioned foreign investment as 
inhibitions of sustainable development in the TWCs which had already 
begun to embrace geographical expansion of capitalist investments in the 
remaining pre-capitalist formations and the traditional sector, where most of 
the population lived with the reservoir of animal wealth and the food and 
cash agricultural crops. The gradual or abrupt liquidation of the public sector 
and state sector was a weighty component of the modern economy of the 
post-independence nationalist state. Influenced by globalization processes, it 
was unclear whether African states would resort to nationalization to 
complete their economic independence, or adopt measures to protect the 
national industry by the guidance and organization of external trade to 
accumulate economic surplus for development. African states might well 
enforce banking policies to guarantee the stability of national currency, or 
offer incentives to attract smuggled national capital, for example emigrant 
remittances, to participate in the national economy and to reinforce the basic 
commodities and the health and education services. “When the rich are a 
small minority and the poor a majority, the gap between the two would 
worsen off. It becomes a matter of time, which way to choose: reforms or 
revolutions” (Nugud, 1997; cited in Mahmoud, 2007:218). 
 Africa’s ways to the substitutes of foreign hegemony were as 
difficult as the capitalist path of foreign investments was. The end of the 
tunnel, nevertheless, was different and was worthy of persistent 
determination and popular movements. The key factor was the African 
negotiator who contended with foreign investors and who would commit 
above all to the needs and aspirations of the indigenous populations – the 
centuries’ most deprived victims of both local and foreign hegemony. The 
strength of African negotiators could be founded on popular support for 
which sake the largest margins of public freedoms and the full enjoyment of 
human rights would be fully guaranteed by the African state. Under this 
humanitarian umbrella of democratic rule, the exercise of freedom of the 
press and expression and the freedom of assembly and organization would 
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restore the civil society status and role in the African modern societies – the 
trade unions and professional associations which led the successful pre-
independence and post-independence struggles before Africa fell to the 
tyrannies of authoritative rule. To strengthen democratic governance in 
Africa, the text and action of the African Union’s Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights should be firmly reformed to meet the challenges of 
progression.  
The effort thus far made to resolve the Darfur Crisis was seriously 
short of the national democratic agenda, namely the surrender of Omer 
Bashir and his military and political accomplices to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) to account for crimes against humanity in Darfur, the 
return of all displaced Darfuris to their lands with full compensations to the 
victims of war, and the establishment of autonomous rule of the region 
within a unified democratic Sudan. Diplomatic moves by the post-Mandella 
South African government, representatives, and lawyers to release Bashir 
from the ICC indictment were entirely rejected by the Darfuris (Simpson & 
Adam, 2014; Darfur Union in the UK, 2017) and opposition groups. The 
democratic agenda alone would end “the persistent violence against civilians, 
[the] complete disregard of basic humanitarian and human rights norms, the 
fact that no significant return of IDPs [Internally Displaced Persons] and 
refugees has taken place, the continued attacks against humanitarian 
workers, the precarious situation at the Chad/Sudan border, and the inability 
of the Sudanese parties to conclude a peace agreement” (African Union PSC, 
2006).  
 
Conclusion 
Early in 1885, the Haitian thinker Joseph Anténor Fermin theorized 
the anthropological unity of humanity as he taught, “human species with its 
unique constitution and organic uniformity… based upon a single blueprint, 
appeared in various parts of the world, under strictly identical conditions… 
Whatever transformations the different groups have undergone… they all 
retain the primordial constitutional imprint of the species, bearing the same 
intellectual and moral traits inscribed in the original common human 
blueprint.” Fermin’s hypothesis “stood the test of time, unlike those 
proposed by the polygenists he was confronting” (Fluehr-Lobban, 2000:457). 
There was much shared between Middle-East nations, especially the 
Gulf States, and the African peoples with respect to culture, religion, 
languages, marriages and alliances. A history of magnificent civilizations 
cemented the social and political connections and the mutual concerns for 
freedom, equity, justice, and economic prosperity tied up the two entities 
since old ages. The Prophet’s Hadith, “My family is white, red, and black,” 
spoke to the oneness of humanity in the universality of Islam which 
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prescribed the rightful commercial and social contacts between individuals 
and groups. Watching the oppression and prejudices against the African and 
Asian workers, these Islamic teachings were seriously ignored. Although the 
Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Middle-Eastern relief efforts in Africa were 
commendable in contemporary times, the thorny conditions of foreign 
workers in the Gulf were non-compliant with international norms. The Gulf 
businesses failed to demonstrate clear adherence to ILO standards, according 
to authentic sources.  
This paper emphasized the urgent need to ensure sustainable 
development for the African peoples in markets free of exploitation and 
abuses of authority. Added to the condemned killings, dehumanization of 
people, and destruction of heritage and property by the investing 
materialism, the financial management of large projects was strongly 
questioned without response from national governments or foreign 
contractors. This unlawful silence was nothing but proof of the non-
transparency of the partners. The African resistance to the causes and effects 
of these ills never ceased to exist. Middle-Eastern governments and 
businesses were strongly asked, on equal terms with African leaderships and 
ruling elites, to cherish the significance of the indigenous transactions and 
cultural values. These value-orientations had been placed in the upper 
echelons of the Pan-African heritage, far beyond the immediate advantage of 
foreign debt services and trade surpluses. National rulers, foreign investors, 
and international agencies were called upon to incorporate the Continent’s 
values, spirit and text, onto the political, financial, and economic actions. 
The continuous perfection of facilities and free markets for foreign 
investments by the present-day African lawmakers entrenched the notorious 
policies that depleted the continent of its resources at expense of the vast 
majority of people. State managers and investment commissioners in Africa 
were equally responsible for this situation: as rulers and domineering elites 
they were required to service the African communities with honesty to 
increase social progression and economic advancement. The governments 
and/or businesses of the Gulf, China, Iran and Turkey went as far as 
assaulting the human rights of African peoples by unprecedented support to 
the continent’s most repressive rulers. All Middle-Eastern, Chinese, and 
foreign investors were urgently required to avoid the past colonial and/or 
neo-colonial experiences that stripped the land and manpower of the 
Continent of Africa, seated a power-thirst middle class in authoritarian 
systems of rule, and impoverished the working class, farmers, and low-
income professionals with lasting poverty. 
The Gulf States seemed to have developed welfare indicators towards 
the wellbeing of their citizens by low IMR, increased literacy, and sufficient 
financial support to local businesses and international enterprises. The 
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relatively high transparency index of Gulf States compared to the low index 
of African states did not restrain the Gulf businesses and China from making 
multi-million deals with low transparency governments, irrespective of 
conditionality of public participation and auditing. The investments thus far 
applied were protected by all-investor sureties; even training requirements 
for nationals were not firmly stipulated. This state of affairs made of foreign 
investment a global perpetuation of both colonial and neo-colonial injustices. 
The needs of African peoples to access sustainable development, 
technological advancement, equalitarian opportunities and planned 
investments were forfeited for the immediate profits and advantages of 
global powers and ruling elites, as well as middle classes’ promised growth.  
The ultimate mission of the African Union was not effectively 
observed to accomplish a successful path of Pan-African development and 
international cooperation to move the continent ahead in accordance with the 
principles of the African Charter, the Maputo Declaration and Arusha 
Accords. The African Union did not pay full recognition to the founding 
visions of the Pan-Africanist thinkers Du Bois, Diop, and Frantz Fanon and 
the gallant legacies of the liberation leaders, Nkrumah, Nasser, Sékou Touré, 
Nyerere, and Mandela. African civil society, human rights, and development 
NGOs envisioned an optimistic future of the Mother Continent. It is high 
time for Africa to review the existing investment laws with clear 
empowering of the public interest and the Charter’s wisdom of shared 
governance. Similarly for the GCC states, “a fundamental recasting of state-
society relations and a reformulation of the pillars of ruling legitimacy” was 
earlier mentioned. Accordingly, foreign benefits must be adjusted to increase 
the local components of development, as necessary conditions of economic 
prosperity and political rest. Here, the message of Maputo Declaration 
(2003) to Africa governments and leaderships envisaged a wide range of 
continental and international obligations to “Take a united stance and 
common position in rejecting and rolling back agreements that have 
exacerbated poverty, underdevelopment and injustice.”  
Based on the fundamental guarantees of Article 21-1 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, “All peoples shall freely dispose of 
their wealth and natural resources,” our paper stressed the following detailed 
actions to redress the crisis of foreign investments in Africa: “Reclaim and 
retain policy space for the regulation and monitoring of the movements of 
capital investments and transnational corporations on the continent; Enhance 
intra-regional trade and harmonize policy frameworks in regional economic 
communities including establishment of mechanisms for regulation and 
control; Take collective action on the call for total and unconditional 
cancellation of African countries external debt, restitution of our stolen 
wealth and the "demand" for reparations;… Ensure participation of civil 
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society to the specialized technical commissions of the African Union; Halt 
and reverse water privatization, biopiracy planting of GMO and life patents 
through national laws, collective positions and strategies at the WTO, IMF 
and World Bank, implementing their commitments to multilateral and 
regional environmental agreements, ensuring corporate accountability; 
Support agricultural marketing, extension services, credit and research with a 
gender perspective to enhance food security; Release all imprisoned African 
journalists and repeal all anti-free expression legislation in Africa” (Maputo 
Declaration, 2003). 
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